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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

There are only two material supported facts set forth by Defendants: (1) Plaintiffs
lived and worked in Idaho and were discharged in Idaho; and (2) Plaintiffs did not report
Amalgamated's sales of adulterated sugar to public authorities.
The rest of the "facts" set forth by Defendant are what it calls "background
information" which are Defendant's arguments regarding its view of the disputed facts.
None of the other "facts" form a basis for the arguments Amalgamated made in the trial
court. All of the district court's rulings (which are what is appealed) were pure
conclusions of law and/or based upon Defendant's bald assertion of "no evidence" which
are, thus, conclusions of fact which are not permitted on a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment and require reversal.
A.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

DEFENDANT'S CONFLICTS OF LAW ARGUMENT.
The only "facts" relied upon by Defendant were the place of residence and the
place where Plaintiffs were fired — Idaho. Those facts are undisputed. No other "facts"
were relied upon (i.e., material to) in this section of Defendant's motion.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW WITHOUT
ALLEGING THE WORD "IDAHO."
The only "fact" supporting this novel argument was the absence of the word
"Idaho" in the complaint. That fact was undisputed. Defendant's arguments regarding
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the effect of such a supposed shortcoming did not rely upon any other "facts."
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT FAILURE TO REPORT TO
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IS FATAL TO A CLAIM FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE.
The only fact relied upon by Defendant was Plaintiffs' admission that they did not
report Amalgamated's to a public authority. The arguments made by Defendant did not
rely upon any other "facts" (i.e., no other "facts" were material to this claim).
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PREEMPTION.
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead it only asserted conclusions of law
regarding its unlikely conclusion that intentional torts are preempted by workers'
compensation under Idaho law.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF LMRA PREEMPTION.
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead, this argument related to the
allegations contained in the complaint as Defendant recast those allegations together with
Defendant's legal conclusions.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT ALLEGED ABUSE WAS NOT
"OUTRAGEOUS."
Defendant did rely on one piece of deposition testimony: Mr. Sparrow's
explanation that he was "bummed out" and a conclusion that Mr. Waddoups was healthy.
Defendant concluded that "bummed out" does not satisfy the requirement that conduct be
"outrageous."
2

DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE WAS
SUPPORTED BY "NO EVIDENCE."
Defendant did not rely on any "facts" to assert this argument. Instead, Defendant
asserted that Plaintiffs only alleged that Amalgamated interfered with its own contractual
relationship with Plaintiffs. If that were Plaintiffs' allegation, indeed, it would only
support a claim for breach of contract rather than tortious interference. But it wasn't
Plaintiffs' claim; rather it was Defendant's attempt to recast the allegations to defeat the
miscast set of allegations.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM REGARDING "CONSPIRACY."
Defendant did not rely on any "facts" to assert this argument. Instead, Defendant
asserted the rule that an entity cannot conspire with itself. If Plaintiffs' allegation had
been that Amalgamated conspired with itself, indeed, a conspiracy claim would not lie.
But it wasn't Plaintiffs' claim; rather it was Defendant's attempt to recast the allegations
to defeat the miscast set of allegations.
B.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT: A motion to dismiss "admits the facts alleged in the
complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts."
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995).

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW.
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead it only asserted conclusions of law
regarding its assertion that the absence of an Idaho case applying its wrongful discharge
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claim to a situation involving a Collective Bargaining Agreement meant that it was
"reasonable to conclude" that Idaho would bar Plaintiffs' claims.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES UNDER THE CBA
The only "facts" relied upon by Defendant were the Plaintiffs' failures to exhaust
their remedies under the CBA. Those facts are undisputed. No other "facts" were relied
upon (i.e., material to) in this section of Defendant's motion to dismiss.
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING
"WHISTLEBLOWING" AND REPORTING TO A PUBLIC
AGENCY.
The only "fact" relied upon by Defendant was the fact that Plaintiffs did not report
Amalgamated's holding and sale of adulterated food to public authorities. Those facts are
undisputed. No other "facts" were relied upon (i.e., material to) in this section of
Defendant's motion.
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF LMRA PREEMPTION.
Defendant does not rely upon any "facts" in support of this argument.
C.

DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF.

DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT ITS MOTIVATION WAS
DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT.
In Defendant's appellate brief, the first section is dedicated to supposedly
"proving" that the Plaintiffs were discharged for "just cause." Appellee's Brief at pp.
15-18; see also Orders of District Court (R. ). Defendant never filed a motion for
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summary judgment on this claim and the district court never awarded a judgment on this
claim. Because the district court never considered this supposed "fact," this Court is
without jurisdiction to consider it. More importantly, the "fact" is "proved" by reference
to its own prior assertions that the Plaintiffs were fired for "unexcused absences" and
Plaintiffs' acknowledgment that that is what they were told. Plaintiffs would refer to this
as "impermissible bootstrapping." The Utah Court of Appeals used different language:
"We believe that it is inappropriate for the court to credit the
defendant's proffered non-discriminatory justification for its decision
to terminate an employee and use that allegation as a basis to find
preemption, thereby potentially depriving the plaintiff of any
remedy."
[The] argument is founded exclusively on Delta's proffered reason
for terminating Hobbs.... However, Delta's motivation is a highly
contested fact that is dispositive of the entire claim.
Hobbs v. Labor Commission, 1999 UT App 308, atffij 14-15, 991 P.2d 590 (quoting
Parise v. Delta Airlines. Inc.. 141 F.3d 1463 (11th Cir. 1998)).
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs were retaliated against and fired due wholly or partly to the actual,
supposed, or threatened disclosure of the adulteration of Amalgamated's stored sugar (by
human blood and flesh) together with their clear refusals to participate in Amalgamated's
wrongful and/or criminal conduct by, among other things, refusing to remain quiet.
Defendant filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" and, later, a "Motion to
Dismiss" (which it later claimed was a motion for summary judgment). Both motions
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were completely unsupported by admissible evidence regarding material facts or
controlling citations to precedent. In fact, Defendant claimed that the lack of facts and
the lack of controlling precedent entitled it to the drastic relief it sought. Defendant based
its Motion for Summary Judgment on a set of what it called in its reply memorandum
"background information" instead of following the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Code of Judicial Administration which requires a movant to begin its memorandum with
a set of facts which it argues is material and to which it argues no dispute exists (and to
which a non-movant must offer rebuttal). Defendant's Reply memo, at p. 3; see also
Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997) ("The trial court erred in not holding the
hearing . . . pursuant to Rule 4-501"). And Defendant began its motion to dismiss with
similar "background facts" none of which were material to its arguments.
Defendant's main legal arguments from its two dispositive motions were (1) Idaho
has a greater interest in Plaintiffs' causes of action than Utah; therefore, Idaho law should
apply; and (2) Idaho has no interest in Plaintiffs' causes of action; therefore their claims
should be dismissed. Defendant's arguments are internally inconsistent. If Idaho has no
interest in providing relief to employees who attempt to further its public policy, then
why should its laws apply to Plaintiffs' claims when it is clear that Utah law would
provide relief? Defendant cannot have it both ways.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be reviewed as follows under
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Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading . . .
UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Of course, if a motion for summary judgment is

not supported, a responding party may rely on the pleadings. As a preliminary matter, it
must be noted that the mere assertion that a material undisputed fact exists without a
proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to support a
summary judgment motion. See Leininger v. Stevens Roger Mfg., 432 P.2d 60 (Utah
1967). In addition, the following is the proper judicial review of any such motion:
[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the
existence of one of the elements of the cause of action, the
nonmoving party then bears the burden of 'providing] some
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential
elements of his [or her] claim.'
Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (quoting Thavne v. Beneficial
Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994)) (emphasis added).
However, before determining whether the nonmoving party has met
its burden, the court hearing the motion for summary judgment must
be satisfied that the moving party has met its burden of proving that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e).
Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). The
Utah Supreme Court has noted (in the context of a summary judgment) that:
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If the [requirements of the rules] are not fulfilled, both in letter and
spirit, the summary judgment procedure may become a vehicle of
injustice rather than a salutary medium of reaching a swift but just
result on a pure matter of law, as intended by the framers of the
rules.
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) (quoting Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Foster. 93 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1957)).
Plaintiffs are also appealing from Defendant's motion to dismiss. "A motion to
dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the Plaintiffs would not be
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to
support their claim." Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). The Court will accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts
in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60
(Utah 1995) (citing Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991)); see also Williams v.
State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (holding that the plaintiffs pleadings
were subject only to the requirement that their adversaries have "'fair notice of the nature
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation
involved."').
The Utah Supreme Court has also explained repeatedly that "Rule 12(b)(6)
concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying merits of a particular
case." Alvarez v. Galetka. 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997) (citing 5A Charles Alan
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Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (2d ed. 1990) and
explaining that the issue in a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "is whether the petitioner has alleged enough in
the complaint to state a cause of action/' which is a question of law); see also Mounteer v.
Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991) (stating that when ruling on a
motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.").
If the Court determines the merits of the underlying allegations, the Court
effectively converts the 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment. The Court
may not unilaterally convert a motion without giving the opposing party a chance to
respond as set forth in Rule 12(c). See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622
(Utah 1990). Because Defendant has not borne its burden to prove that it "clearly appears
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claims...," the district
court's ruling of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be reversed. Anderson v. Dean
Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires simply that:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for
the relief to which he deems himself entitled.
The pleadings must be sufficient to give "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim
asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Blackham v.
9

Snelgrove. 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955). Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when
determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint. See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d
86, 91 (Utah 1963) ("What [the parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required.").
In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed
when determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint," Gill v. Timmu 720 P.2d
1352, 1353 (Utah 1986) and the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). The days of strict adherence
to draconian formalities at the pleading stage are over, and the district court's approbation
of this Defendant's use of adhesion contract analysis for "interpreting" Defendant's
distortion of the complaint's allegations must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
L

DEFENDANT'S FIRST APPELLATE ARGUMENT WAS NEVER
MADE TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND NO ORDER WAS EVER
ENTERED REGARDING THIS NEW ARGUMENT; THEREFORE,
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT'S
NEW ARGUMENT.

In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary
Judgment Order"), the District Court did not make the factual determination that
Defendant's motivation was its strict adherence to its rules regarding "unexcused
absences." (R. 918-921). In the Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
("Motion to Dismiss Order") the District Court did not make the factual determination
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that Defendant's motivation was its strict adherence to its rules regarding "unexcused
absences." (R. 1391-1393). Moreover, motivation is never proper for disposition on
summary judgment and facts are not determined under Rule 56 or Rule 12. See Sandberg
v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) (explaining that where the parties were not in
complete conflict as to certain facts, but the understanding, intention, and
consequences of those facts were vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper for
summary judgment and could only be resolved by a trial).
If an issue was not presented to the district court, this Court does not have
jurisdiction. One Int'L Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993).
Defendant does make some misleading references to its prior presentation of what were
"not material facts, but merely background information" (R. 534) that it provided in
its memoranda. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 15-18. However, it is undisputed that
Defendant never even attempted to make any argument to support this new conclusory
assertion and the Court never considered this new assertion, nor did it make a ruling. See
supra, at pp. 4-5.
Although Defendant dismissively refers to Plaintiffs' request that this Court
determine whether Rule 4-501 is binding on courts and litigants as "purely rhetorical" this
new argument presented by this Defendant is a perfect example of why the appealed of
this issue is "purely practical." This Defendant does not present "facts" that it claims are
material to its arguments; rather it presents "background information." If a litigant is
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going attempt to make a competent motion for summary judgment, it should follow the
applicable rules so that courts and adversaries can discern which facts are claimed to be
"undisputed" and "material" instead of permitting a party to later describe its assertions as
"background information" and still later, on appeal, recast the conclusions as "material"
to an argument it implies it made but, in fact, had never made before.

II.

UTAH LAW GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS BECAUSE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THE SUBSTANCE OF IDAHO
LAW.

A party who wishes to have the Court apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction must
prove the substance of the foreign jurisdiction's law. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Bunker 699
P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) ("In the absence of appropriate references to the applicable
law of a foreign jurisdiction, that law will be presumed to be the same as Utah law")
(citing Booth v. Crompton. Utah, 583 P.2d 82 (1978); Maple v. Maple. Utah, 566 P.2d
1229 (1977)). Instead of proving the substance of Idaho law, Defendant cited several
cases from Idaho with facts that are not identical to the facts of this case. Defendant then
asserted that "it is reasonable to conclude" that no cause of action exists for a case such as
the instant one. (R. 1040).
If the Idaho lottery offers $76 million for guessing the right numbers, "it is
reasonable to conclude" that the numbers are 5, 14, 21, 33, 41, and Powerball 27. Just
because "it is reasonable to conclude" that those numbers are the winning numbers, a
reasonable person would not expect to receive the $76 million. "Reasonable to conclude"
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is a synonym for "pure and unbridled speculation" and/or "wild and unfounded guess." It
is hardly proof of the substance of the foreign jurisdiction's law.
Even if the district court's conflict of laws analysis were correct, because this
Defendant made no effort to prove the substance of Idaho law, the district court was
required to apply the law of the forum — Utah law. See, e.g.. 15A C.J.S. Conflict of
Laws, §3(9) (stating that there is "a presumption that the foreign law is the same as the
law of the forum."); Restatement of Conflict of Laws §136, comment h ("where either no
information, or else insufficient information, has been obtained about the foreign law, the
forum will usually decide the case in accordance with its own local law . . . . ) ; Bartsch v.
M.G.M.. Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert, denied 393 U.S. 826 (1968) (applying
the theory that there can be no other law before the court until a party wishing to rely
upon foreign law proves its substance). Instead, of acknowledging the lex fori rule, the
district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint asserting that it had "already decided that"
and ruling that the complaint "failed to state a claim under Idaho law."
III.

APPLICATION OF UTAH LAW IS PROPER, AND REQUIRES THE
REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING.

The Utah Supreme Court considered and rejected this Defendant's conclusory
assertions relating to wrongful discharge claims where the parties are subject to a
collective bargaining agreement in no uncertain terms:
They argue that because the contractual provision protecting an
employee from all but a just-cause dismissal protects the same
interests as a tort cause of action for discharge in violation of public
13

policy, no purpose is served by permitting a discharged employee to
proceed on the tort claim when he or she has a contractual cause of
action. Defendants contend that the contractual provision adequately
vindicates the public policy underlying the tort claim.
We disagree. As adopted in Peterson, the tort of discharge in
violation of public policy differs in both scope and sanction from
any contractual provision that might limit an employer's power
to discharge an employee for other than just cause. See Peterson
832 P.2d at 1282-83, 1285 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at
1285-86 (Howe, A.CJ., concurring). Both respect for precedent and
sound public policy compel the conclusion that the tort of discharge
in violation of public policy should be available to all employees,
regardless of their contractual status.
Retherford v. AT & T Communications. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).
Through its silence, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged
pretextual firings in violation of Utah's clear and substantial public policy and that their
wrongful discharge causes of action are both permitted under Utah law and not preempted
by the LMRA. Nevertheless, Defendant doggedly insists that Idaho law applies to the
claims because that was the situs of the firings. Idaho law, it then asserts, destroys
Plaintiffs' claims because the cause of action sounds in contract.
Defendant reasons that because the "just cause" requirement arises out of a
contract (the CBA) and the Idaho wrongful discharge claim sounds in contract, Plaintiffs'
claims must be preempted. This non-sequitur forms the foundation for Defendant's
LMRA preemption arguments. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 23-37.
Utah has held that wrongful discharge sounds in tort and Idaho has held that its
cause of action sounds in contract. This is a distinction without a difference insofar as
14

preemption is concernced. Normally, there is a distinction, for example, in the types of
damages available. However, Idaho permits the imposition of punitive damages for bad
faith despite the fact that it sounds in contract and "it is reasonable to conclude" that
punitive damages would be available in this case.
More to the point, the wrongful discharge cause of action has developed because,
in theory, permitting a cause of action by ex-employees against ex-employers where the
latter group's actions would have the tendency to harm the public (not where the latter
group's actions would have a tendency to harm the former group) will prevent violations
of public policy as effectively as regulating the employers. This de facto regulation is the
underpinning of the cause of action even though the damages awarded (i.e., the remedy1)
for the injury to the public are measured by the individual ex-employees' financial losses.
Both states agree that the elements underlying the wrongful discharge cause of
action are constructively imposed as a matter of law. See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
Dist.. 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (holding that under Idaho law, public policy is
implicated by any firing "motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation [because
such conduct] is not the best interest of the economic system or the public good"). In other
words, the employer's duties to the public (the breach of which gives rise to the cause of

1

Defendant argues that the "injury" under the conflict of laws analysis is "clearly"
the financial injury to the plaintiffs who lost their jobs. However, the "injury" is the
damage to public policy or to the public, and the remedy is measured by the financial
injury to the plaintiffs. This concept is not dissimilar to physical injuries to a person
which are remedied by providing the victim with money.
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action) cannot be negotiated or waived by either party to the employment contract
(regardless of whether the contract between the employee and the employer is express,
like the CBA, or implied, like employment-at-will).
A primary distinction between a tort and a contract is, generally, that the
relationship between parties to a tort is defined by law, and the relationship between the
parties to a contract is defined by the parties. In this case, that distinction does not apply.
The relationship which forms the underpinning of the cause of action for wrongful
discharge is defined by law regardless of whether the cause of action sounds in tort (Utah)
or contract (Idaho). This is true regardless of whether the contract relating to termination
of the employment relationship (a firing is an element of the cause of action) provides a
right of termination for any reason or no reason (employment-at-will) or a "just cause"
requirement (collective bargaining agreement).
The key element is the nexus between the firing and public policy. Under Idaho
law, the concentration is on the "motivation" for the firing. A constructive covenant of
any employment contract in Idaho is that the true motivation of the firing not be a
motivation which is proscribed by Idaho law. The violation of this constructive covenant
gives rise to the wrongful discharge cause of action in Idaho.
It should go without saying: A cause of action arising out of an employer's breach
of its obligation which is imposed by law is not preempted by the LMRA because the
LMRA only preempts causes of action arising out of an employer's breach of its
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obligation which is imposed by the collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202,211-13 (1985).
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE "MOST
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP" TEST WHILE APPLYING LEX
LOCI DELICTUS IN SUBSTANCE.

All of Defendant's arguments reflect its "law of the situs" analysis and its
presentation of conclusions of other courts is without an analysis of the reasoned
justification for those conclusions. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 18-23. With the aid of the
foregoing explanation of the importance of the "public policy" aspect of the wrongful
discharge cause of action, it can more easily be demonstrated that the "most significant
relationship" test requires the application of Utah law.
As explained above, the primary purpose of the wrongful discharge cause of action
is to regulate the conduct of employers. The Amalgamated Sugar Co. is a Utah company
with its management and corporate headquarters located in Ogden, Utah.
This is not a case where [Utah] courts are attempting to regulate
employment activity in other states. Rather, it is a case where the
plaintiffs] seek[] to invoke [Utah] law to regulate the activity of a
[Utah] corporation.
Bumside v. Simpson Paper Co.. 832 P.2d 537, 544 (Wash.App.Div 1 1992). The State of
Utah has a strong interest in regulating the unlawful actions of its citizens (Defendant), in
protecting its citizens (Plaintiff Waddoups) from unlawful abuse, and in protecting its
citizens (the public) from infection and disease caused by Amalgamated's sale of
adulterated food products. Utah shall not be the Barbary Coast of corporate pirates.
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Moreover, when Amalgamated, a Utah corporation, sows the stream of interstate
commerce with food products (which are contaminated by human blood and flesh), the
State of Utah is likely to reap adulterated food, disease, and possibly death.2 Certainly,
Utah has a strong interest in applying its laws both to protect and to regulate its citizens.3
V.

DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO
REPORT ITS MISCONDUCT TO A PUBLIC AGENCY BARS
THEIR CLAIMS IS FRIVOLOUS.

In view of the fact that the public goal of food safety can be advanced through
internal vigilance as well as through governmental oversight, Plaintiffs' claims are not
barred by their failure to report Amalgamated's malfeasance to a public authority.
Defendant's firing of Plaintiffs for the purpose of concealing its violation of public policy
rendered an otherwise private matter repugnant to the public good.
The employee who chooses to approach his employer should not be
denied a remedy simply because a direct report to law enforcement
agencies might effectuate the exposure of crime more quickly. This
would be a nonsensical distinction.
Parr v. Triplett Corp., 727 F. Supp 1163, 1166-77 (N.D. 111. 1989).

2

"The purpose of [food safety statutes] is clearly the protection of the public
health and safety. The accomplishment of that purpose is of prime importance and must
be vigorously championed. The high degree of danger and serious consequences latent in
the distribution of food to the public require the imposition of the duty amounting to the
creation of the strictest liability." Niemann v. Grand Central Market, Inc., 337 P.2d 424
(Utah 1959).
3

See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.. 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (holding that the
United States is not barred by international law from governing the conduct of its citizens
on the high seas or in foreign countries).
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The allegations regarding Amalgamated's violation of public policy interests "are
not dependent on reporting them to an outside agency; they stand on their own."
Verduzco v. General Dynamics. 742 F. Supp 559, 562 (S.D. Cal. 1990); accord Mover v.
Allen Freight Lines. Inc.. 885 P.2d 391, 395 (Kan. App. 1994) ("[A]n employee may
report a serious infraction of a rule, regulation, or law to either company management or
law enforcement officials.").
Defendant Amalgamated argues that the recent Utah case of Fox v. MCI supports
its conclusion. Defendant Amalgamated misrepresents the holding in Fox.
Fox did not overrule previous Utah law sub silentio. See Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration. 909 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness to read case
to overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different"). The Utah
Supreme Court specifically stated in Heslop:
We do not agree that plaintiff cannot meet a public policy
requirement simply because he did not report the violation to the
Attorney General or to the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all
internal methods for resolving the problem; he need not have gone
outside the Bank to try to correct the policy violation.
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992) (noting that the act considered
served a substantial public policy because it protects the public as well as regulating
financial institutions themselves). The analysis in Fox only addresses the public policy of
criminal law enforcement — not the policy achieved by the law. By their nature, criminal
laws cannot be enforced unless reported. On the other hand, food can be kept clean and
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the public can be kept healthy without reports to public authorities. In this situation:
[A] fundamental public interest is implicated whether or not the
plaintiff reports any alleged wrongdoing to an outside agency, and
whether or not a statute has been violated.
Verduzco, 742 F. Supp at 561: accord Moskal v. Fist Tennessee Bank, 815 S.W.2d 509
(Tenn. App. 1991) (acknowledging cause of action asserted by employee who refused to
participate, continue to participate, or remain silent about illegal activities); See also
Bovle v. Vista Eyewear. Inc.. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) (holding that allegation
of employer's violation of FDA standards was basis of public policy exception where
fired employee warned and threatened employer, continued to attempt to comply with
FDA regulations and eventually reported her employer to the FDA. "[A]ny one of those
allegations would state a cause of action." Id. at 877); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (holding that employee had a cause of action for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where he urged his employer to comply
with state FDCA); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores. Inc.. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that an employee who was discharged where complaints concerned his
employer's sale and delivery of adulterated milk stated a claim under California law).
In addition, Mr. Sparrow was harassed for cooperating with and supporting Mr.
Waddoups and was fired only days after Mr. Waddoups's suspension. See, e^g., Reich v.
Cambridgeport Air Systems. Inc., 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (addressing questions of
fact raised by joint actors in employee-housecleaning meant "to impress on employees
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not to be palsy with bad actors.").
VI.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE
FACTUAL QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY.

The Defendant did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate the non-existence of a
dispute as to the material facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims. Instead, this Defendant
simply glommed on to a single proletarian phrase uttered by one of the Plaintiffs:
"bummed out" (R. 339) and mixed it with its own favorite crass phrase "no evidence."
Defendant insists that its denigration of Mr. Sparrow's lexicon and attribution of that
lingo Mr. Waddoups entitles it to a summary judgment because Mr. Sparrow's phrase
"hardly shows a 'disabling' condition" while it presents its own hackneyed phrase which
"hardly shows an entitlement to summary judgment." See Appellee's Brief at n. 11.
While Defendant is correct that "bummed out," standing alone, does not "show"
disablement by a preponderance of the evidence, it does create an issue of material
disputed fact. Its phrase of "no evidence" does nothing except demonstrate its own
failure to properly support its motion as provided for in Rule 56.
Defendant also insists that its conduct toward Plaintiffs prior to their discharges
was not "outrageous." Amalgamated's manager4 grabbed Mr. Waddoups and forcibly

4

Defendant makes the wild assumption that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the
perpetrator was a manager. First, its source of this "clarification" is a self-serving
assertion rather than any testimony or Plaintiffs' actual allegations. Second, even if the
perpetrator were a non-manager, it would be Amalgamated's agent at company-mandated
calisthenics. These facts would still give rise to a finding of Amalgamated's culpability
by a factual finding of approbation or subsequent failure to disavow the actions.
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simulated a homosexual sex act (portraying Plaintiff as the scapegoat for the death of the
homosexual and concomitant contamination as well as graphically illustrating
management's view that in this particular male-on-male relationship it would be the
dominant "butch" partner in response to Plaintiffs' outspoken complaints).
Amalgamated's manager slapped Mr. Sparrow in the head with a notebook and taunted
him about his firing (foreshadowing the then-future event). While it appears that such
conduct is deemed acceptable and commonplace in the experience of Amalgamated's
management, this Court may state as a matter of law that such conduct would be deemed
outrageous by normal citizens.
Moreover, outrageousness in this case will be proved by the totality of the
evidence, not by taking a single inapt phrase out of context and by itself. Plaintiff
Waddoups could not sleep for a significant period of time and Plaintiff Sparrow could not
get out of bed to provide a living for himself.
Disability will be shown not just by the Plaintiffs' visits to psychiatrists. People
who have no money because their employer has wrongfully discharged them don't
respond to disabling emotional distress by visiting a psychiatrist. They drink. Heavily.
This Defendant's condescending assertion that it is entitled to a summary
judgment because it repeats "no evidence" over and over and because the Plaintiffs have
not provided it with proof of a doctor's diagnosis (because this Defendant never requested

22

such information5) is frivolous. It must ask the proper questions, apply the proper
standards and, usually, wait for the presentation of all of the evidence to a jury. This
Defendant has simply implied that the Plaintiffs must have been motionless and helpless
for the past six years or else they were not disabled by its outrageous misconduct and are
entitled to no remedy. Such an interpretation of "disabled" is frivolous.
The above facts, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as required on a
motion for summary judgment, would at least suffice to create an issue of material fact.
See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("As the moving
party, [Defendant] had the affirmative burden of establishing [by doing more than
saying "no evidence] that there were no material issues of fact as to its liability.").
Lastly, Defendant argues workers' compensation exclusivity. "Intentional" torts
are not "accidents" under Idaho's workers' compensation scheme. Therefore,
Defendant's argument is without merit.
VII.

DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED WITH
PLAINTIFFS' PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

5

Rule 56 cannot be converted into a de facto discovery technique by permitting
defendants to file dispositive motions alleging "no evidence." A party who is faced with
one of these frivolous "no evidence" motions should not face dismissal of their claims if
they do not prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence in response to the
motion. A responding party is not required to respond with any additional information
beyond their pleadings unless the moving party in a "no evidence" motion presents proof
that the moving party has properly inquired into all material facts underlying the elements
of the cause of action. Nothing in Rule 56 or this Court's caselaw provides for this
Defendant's absurd abuse of the judicial system by simply asserting "no evidence."
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Defendant fired Plaintiffs for unlawful reasons, misrepresented their true
motivation to the unemployment compensation board, and placed a permanent black mark
on Plaintiffs' work history. Despite the "no evidence" assertions made by this Defendant,
this Court has already ruled that "discharge of an employee because of his failure to
violate a clear and substantial public policy is an 'improper purpose'" under this cause of
action. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d at 1284 (Utah 1994). Therefore, this Court
should find that there are questions of fact and reverse the Summary Judgment Order and
Order of Dismissal.
VIII. DEFENDANT MISREPRESENTED FACTS.
This Defendant claims that it did not misrepresent facts, instead it "merely quoted
from [Plaintiff Waddoups's] deposition testimony." This assertion is false. This
Defendant never acknowledged its misrepresentation or withdrew it. Instead it
compounds the original failure of honesty toward the tribunal. To be perfectly clear,
Defendant stated as follows: "Waddoups in his deposition testified that he 'never' said
to the Company that he was thinking of going public with any concern about
contaminated sugar." (R. 1187). This statement has repeatedly been shown to be
abjectly false. If this misstatement had been inadvertent, it would have been withdrawn
and clarified years ago.6 It has not been corrected, and the district court probably relied
6

Note: Plaintiffs have declined to appeal the district court's denials of their Rule
11 motions and present this argument for the purpose of clarifying the failure of this
Defendant to provide proper support for its dispositive motions and also to counteract this
Defendant's attacks on Plaintiffs' counsel which are set forth in its brief.
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upon this statement which is, at best, misleading. See Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, at n.
5, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Courts have repeatedly decried misleading statements by
counsel because they do not promote justice, tend to provoke and enrage opposing
counsel, and tend to interfere with smooth operation of the courts and their truth-finding
mission.
In this case, Findlay has quoted the statute to read as he would like it
to read. When one inserts the language that he omitted from his
quote, it is obvious that the statute does not stand for the proposition
that he claims it supports. On the basis of the facts presented, it is
clear that the quote was meant to mislead the court. This behavior
will not be tolerated.
Cascade Energy v. Banks. 87 F.3d 1146 (D. Utah 1996) (citation omitted). The trial court
both tolerated and rewarded this Defendant's misleading statement of fact which formed a
basis for its argument.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse all the District
Court's rulings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ d a y of April, 2001.
CARR& WXDBOXJPS

JTRENT J. WADDO^

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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